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9 November 1962

SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 85-4-62

+ Castro's Subversive Capabilities
in Latin America



Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
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
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CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES IN LATIN AMERICA


THE PROBLEM

To describe and evaluate Castro's capabilities, with Soviet help, for carrying out subversion and sabotage in Latin America



SUMMARY

A. The dangerously unstable situation that prevails throughout much of Latin America is the product of fundamental inequities and historic circumstances; it is not the creation of Castro and the Soviets. Castro's efforts, with Soviet help, to exploit this situation by means of subversion and sabotage have not produced significant results.



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There are many targets in the hemisphere vulnerable to Castro-Communist subversion and sabotage, and the Soviets are likely to assist Castro in reaching them by contributing both to his security at home and to his capability for action overseas.

[REDACTED]

C.

[REDACTED]

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THE ESTIMATE

Aims

1. From the time of his accession to power Fidel Castro has sought to gain acceptance of the Cuban revolution as a model for others and of himself as the leader of revolutionary forces throughout Latin America. He has constantly sought to foment revolutions in other Latin American States. Moreover, Castro has generally had the support of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in the pursuit of these aims.

Means

2. Castro began his career of sponsorship for revolutions in Latin America in 1959 with landings of small rebel forces in Nicaragua, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. None of these were successful and he turned to other means.

3. From the beginning, propaganda has been one of the principal instruments on which Castro has relied. In addition to the main transmissions of Radio Havana for external listeners, which have had a great deal of revolutionary content, he has beamed special programs devised to stimulate revolutionary action to each of half a dozen selected countries. A major effort has been made through *Prensa Latina*, the Cuban news service, to disseminate Castro-Communist propaganda. Printed propaganda has also been sent from Cuba into most other Latin American States, and Cuban diplomatic missions and personnel have actively disseminated it. Students returning from indoctrination in Cuba have helped establish Cuban Institutes for Friendship among Peoples which have functioned as propaganda outlets.

4. Thousands of Latin Americans have been brought to Cuba [REDACTED] Many hundreds have been trained in revolutionary techniques and guerrilla warfare. Cuba has been made a main transit point for travel between Latin America and the Bloc.

5. Financial support has been provided by Cuba to revolutionary groups in a number of countries [REDACTED] Arms shipments have [REDACTED]

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also been reported [redacted]

We believe that there is an extensive agent net in Latin America directed from Havana.

6 Castro has associated himself with revolutionary activist groups throughout Latin America. In most cases these have been Communist, but where the regular Communist Party favored a legal or parliamentary line he has not hesitated to support dissident Communist groups, e.g., in Brazil, and non-Communist revolutionaries, e.g., in Guatemala and El Salvador. In some cases he has sponsored new revolutionary organizations, e.g., in Panama, Colombia, and Peru. In Chile he has endorsed a popular front coalition made up of Communist and moderate leftists.

Evaluation

7. Instances of financial and material support sent by Cuba to revolutionaries in other countries which have come to our attention are probably only a part of the total effort.

[redacted] Yet along with the political and psychological stimulus which Castro's influence has provided, Cuban subversive activities have perceptibly strengthened activist revolutionary groups. Dangerous situations subject to exploitation by Castro and the Communists exist in a number of Latin American countries—

[redacted] These dangers arise from political and social tensions which existed long before Castro came to power. They might lie dormant for some time; but with Castro as a potential detonator, they are more likely to blow up. The detonative compound will exist as long as Castroism survives, whatever may happen to Castro personally.

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Support Which Castro Can Expect in the Future

11. The range of Castro's support has been, we believe, considerably narrowed by events since Castro declared himself a Communist. Revelation of the fact that he had allowed the Soviets to establish offensive bases under exclusive Soviet control has alienated many non-Communist nationalists, genuine neutrals, and even revolutionaries seeking social and economic betterment.

12. The activist revolutionaries are probably the only important force on which Castro can now count, but even their support has apparently been rendered less effective by differences on the question of Soviet relations with Castro and with Latin American Communist parties.

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Castro's Resources for Continued Subversive Activity

13. Arms. [REDACTED] Castro has substantial stocks of arms. In addition to Soviet Bloc material there are stores of arms inherited from the Batista regime not being used by Castro forces and available for distribution outside Cuba. In the past he has apparently been hampered in his efforts to use arms for subversive purposes by problems of transport and delivery. He has at his disposal, however, 11 IL-14 transports belonging to Cubana airlines which could be used to deliver arms under certain circumstances. The IL-28's now in Cuba are inappropriate for subversive purposes. However, they could be used for air drops. Cuba has many small craft suitable for infiltration of men and arms.

[REDACTED]

14. Propaganda apparatus. Castro's propaganda machine remains intact. For the time being, however, his diplomatic missions are likely to find it harder to disseminate propaganda than in the past, both because of new precautions by local governments and because of a reduction in the numbers of cooperative volunteers outside the organized Communist groups.

15. Money and equipment.

[REDACTED] we believe that the Soviets will continue to supply Castro with money, supplies, and equipment for subversive activity. The Soviets have certainly supplied Castro with sophisticated instruments of intelligence collection, sabotage, and clandestine communications.

16. Organization.

[REDACTED]

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Other Factors on Which Castro's Subversive Capability Will Depend

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18. Situation in Cuba. Castro's ability to engage in subversive activities will be influenced significantly by the strength and stability of his position at home. Heightened political and economic difficulties in Cuba would restrict Castro's subversive effort, while the more secure he is at home, the more freedom and strength he is likely to have for subverting other governments and re-establishing his prestige and influence. Castro's position in Cuba will depend in part on his own policies, but is likely to depend even more upon those of the Soviets.

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Likely Future Targets for Cuban Sabotage

23. The extent of Castro's capabilities for sabotage and other clandestine activity in Latin America will depend upon the complicated factors noted above. Whatever his capabilities are, he will not be at a loss for targets against which to use them. Some of the more obvious targets are:

a. [Redacted]

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b. Physical targets vulnerable to a limited sabotage effort.

c. Political targets susceptible to exploitation.

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ANNEX A

HIGHLIGHTS OF CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN
OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO DATE

1. Cuban subversive activities of one sort or another have been directed toward virtually every other Latin American State. Cuban Embassies have been without exception centers for propaganda and efforts to cultivate receptive local groups, whether they be Castroite, regular Communist, leftist, or simply disgruntled with the existing regime. The Cuban Embassy is commonly a disburser of funds for subversive purposes. Radio propaganda from Havana has been and is being beamed at each of the Latin American States, sometimes tailored to have particular local impact. Sympathetic nationals from the other Latin American States have been encouraged and given financial support to come to Cuba for varying lengths of time for training, goodwill visits, or for purposes of instruction and coordination of subversive programs.


2. The above represents a general pattern. There are, of course, significant variations and different degrees of effort, depending on how Castro's regime views the importance and vulnerability of the target country. The following represents a summary, country by country, of the most typical reports of Cuban subversive activity available to us.



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
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
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
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


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ANNEX B



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
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
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